The establishment of the World Bank Inspection Panel is a crucial development in handling the negative social and environmental impacts of Bank-financed projects. It allows affected people to seek redress for the harms resulting from projects, by questioning the legitimacy of the Bank's lending decisions. The Panel has the mandate to examine whether the Bank has complied with its own safeguard policies in specific projects. Even though the substantive rules applicable in the Panel's investigation process (ie, the World Bank's Operational Policies and Bank Procedures) refer to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs); the Panel has considered the borrowers' environmental treaty commitments extensively in its investigations on a few occasions. This paper examines the extent to which the World Bank Inspection Panel-as an accountability mechanism-has employed different MEAs to address environmental issues resulting from Bank-funded projects, thereby ensuring compliance with environmental treaty obligations in project finance activities.
Introduction
In recent years, the World Bank Group has increasingly opened its doors to civil society in order to be more responsive to those who may be affected by its operations. 1 The World Bank Inspection Panel (herein, Panel or Inspection Panel) is a classic example of addressing public concerns about the social and environmental impacts of Bank-financed projects. This citizen-driven accountability mechanism allows those who are affected by projects supported by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the International Development Association (IDA) to file claims before it. The Inspection Panel has the mandate to examine whether the Bank's lending decisions have complied with its own safeguard policies. Legal scholarship has focused on the role of this kind of complaint and grievance mechanism in enhancing the public accountability of multilateral development banks (MDBs). However, a particular strength of the Panel that promotes the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in project finance has not been explored. This strength relates to the proactive role played by the Inspection Panel in examining the project's compliance with MEA obligations through its investigatory mandate. In the substantive rules applicable in the Inspection Panel's investigation process, MEAs are referred to only on a few occasions. In practice, however, the borrowing governments' MEA obligations have been examined in a manner that is far more extensive than those explicitly stipulated in the Bank's safeguard policies by the Panel. This paper seeks to explore the extent to which the Panel, as a non-judicial mechanism, has employed MEAs to address environmental issues arising from Bank-funded projects, thereby ensuring compliance with environmental treaty obligations in the course of project finance activities.
After this introduction, the second section discusses the institutional aspect of the Inspection Panel. This section initially identifies the Inspection Panel's composition and the rules to safeguard its independence. It then evaluates the accessibility of civil society organisations to the Panel. This involves examining the requirements which an eligible requester and request have to satisfy when making complaints. It also discusses the Panel's investigation process and the procedural reform in recent years. The third section examines the substantive rules applicable in determining environmental issues before the Inspection Panel. It illustrates the World Bank's environment-related safeguard policies, and explores the relationship between, and the cross-fertilisation of, these rules and MEAs. This section also considers the influences that these rules may have on different stakeholders. The fourth section analyses how the Panel has treated MEAs in addressing private complaints about environmental impacts arising from Bank-financed projects. Drawing upon the recent practice of the Inspection Panel, this section examines the implications of the Panel's findings for the implementation of MEA obligations in the context of project finance.
The Institutional Aspect of the World Bank Inspection Panel

The Composition of the Inspection Panel
The Inspection Panel comprises three inspectors of different nationalities. They are nominated by the World Bank's President after consultation with the Bank's Board of Executive Directors 2 and are appointed by the Board. 3 Panel members must meet certain criteria, including being able to address the requests thoroughly and fairly, having integrity and independence from Bank Management 4 and understanding the development issues in, and the living conditions of, developing countries.
5
To ensure that the Inspection Panel can exercise its investigatory power towards the conduct of the management department in the same institution impartially, safeguarding the Panel's independence is of pressing importance. Five requirements, especially post-employment restrictions, have thus been set out. First, Panel members serve a non-renewable five-year term of office and cannot be re-elected. 6 Only the Board of Executive Directors can remove them from office. Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel (n 3) para 4. 6 ibid para 3. 7 ibid para 8.
However, a single individual cannot file a request. The limitation to two or more affected persons to submit a request is due to the concern that if a single individual is allowed to make the request, the Inspection Panel would be flooded 8 ibid para 5. 9 ibid para 6. 10 ibid para 10. 11 ibid; For these privileges and immunities, with complaints and it would overburden its capacity to investigate. It is also to be expected that the negative impacts of project activities would not only affect a single individual. 16 When appropriate local representation of such affected parties is not available, the Board of Executive Directors may allow requests from nonlocal representatives.
17
In contrast, a proposal from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) during the 1996 Review of the Inspection Panel, to the effect that foreign and local NGOs whose rights or interests were not affected by projects should also be allowed to file requests, was rejected. 18 This reflects the continuing concern that foreign NGOs may use the Inspection Panel to intervene in the domestic affairs of borrowing countries. 19 The same rationale is also reflected by the fact that there should be a direct link between affected parties and the rights or interests for which they claim to be affected by project activities. In cases where representatives bring requests on behalf of affected parties they should provide evidence that they have been duly entrusted to do so. 20 Finally, the complaint may also be submitted by entities other than the affected parties. According to the Resolution Establishing the Inspection Panel, in special cases of serious alleged violations of Bank policies and procedures, 21 any Executive Director may ask the Inspection Panel for an investigation. Also, the Executive Directors acting as a Board may instruct the Panel to conduct an investigation. 22 However, to date this provision has never been utilised. Several requirements must be met to initiate the investigation. First, the requester has to demonstrate that its rights or interests have been, or will potentially be, affected by acts or omissions of the Bank. 23 Second, the alleged damage should result from the Bank's failure to follow its policies and procedures in respect of the project's design, appraisal and/or implementation. Such a failure should also the request has been dealt with in a prior request, unless there is new evidence or circumstances not known at the time of the prior request.
27
Regarding the eligibility phase, the Inspection Panel has piloted a new approach with a view to reaching early solutions for issues of alleged harm without recourse to a full investigation. According to the revised Operating Procedures, the Inspection Panel will postpone its decision on registration of the request, which would otherwise be an eligible request, to offer additional opportunities for Bank Management and the requester to address the issues raised in the request.
28
This optional approach is adopted on a case-by-case basis and depends on the willingness of Bank Management and the consent of the requester. After the 1999 Review of the Inspection Panel, as will be illustrated below, the Board of Executive Directors' discretionary authority on whether an investigation should be undertaken has to a large extent been shifted to the Inspection Panel. The new pilot approach for early problem-solving through dialogue between different stakeholders further strengthens the Panel's independence from the Board. The adoption of this pilot approach does not affect the Inspection Panel's discretion to recommend a full investigation in light of Management's and the borrower's efforts to address the requester's concerns.
After the registration, Bank Management should submit its response to the request to the Inspection Panel. 30 Once it has received Management's response, the Panel conducts a preliminary review to determine whether to recommend an investigation to the Board of Executive Directors. In this phase, the Panel assesses whether: (i) there is a plausible causal link between the alleged harm and the project; (ii) the alleged harm and possible non-compliance with Bank policies and procedures are of a serious character; (iii) Bank Management has dealt appropriately with the issues raised in the request, and has clearly shown that it has followed the required safeguard policies, or Management has acknowledged that it did not adhere to relevant policies and procedures; and (iv) remedial actions proposed by Management are adequate. 31 The Board then makes a final decision.
32
In addition to the abovementioned requirements, which constitute the basis for the Panel not to recommend the request to the Board for authorising the investigation, in recent years the Panel has also deferred its decision on whether to recommend an investigation in order to provide additional time for Bank Management and the requester to seek solutions. In several cases this has resulted in the Panel not recommending full investigations to the Board. 33 The Board of Executive Directors used to have considerable discretion in deciding whether to authorise an investigation. In the first five years of the Inspection Panel's operation (ie, from its establishment to the second review of the Inspection Panel in 1999) the Board often turned down the Panel's recommendations. During this period, the Board rejected four out of the six requests recommended by the 30 
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with the borrower in binding terms and supervise the borrower's implementation of its contractual obligations.
58
There are several aspects to the relationship between the Bank's environmentrelated safeguard policies and international environmental law. First, the interpretation of these Bank rules may have to take into account principles and rules of international law, which could extend to environmental norms. 59 Although the Bank's safeguard policies are its internal regulations aiming at binding Bank staff in handling project activities, their application can have farreaching implications for the Bank, the borrowing government and civil society. 66 In terms of the Bank, since its staff must comply with these standards, their decisions on relevant social and environmental issues constitute the Bank's important practice on project finance operations. Also, by requiring the borrower to meet the requirements of the loan agreement, especially to refrain from contravening its environmental treaty obligations, the Bank plays a crucial role in promoting compliance with MEAs.
67
In terms of the borrower, while the Bank's safeguard policies are not intended to impose obligations directly on the borrowing government when receiving Bank finance, the borrower has to carry out substantive obligations throughout the project cycle when these rules are incorporated into the loan agreement. If the borrower fails to meet its contractual obligations, the Bank can impose sanctions (such as suspension or cancellation of the loan) on the borrower. 68 This shows the profound impact that the Bank's safeguard policies can have on the manner in which the borrower conducts its project finance activities. The external effects of the Bank's safeguard policies are also evident with civil society. As these standards aim to ensure the quality of the Bank's project finance operations, they are not formulated in terms of individuals' rights. 69 Nevertheless, when these rules are duly implemented, they can protect the rights or interests of local populations in borrowing countries. Project-affected people can use these rules to question the legitimacy of the Bank's lending operations. The Bank's safeguard policies thus constitute an avenue for civil society to oversee the lending institution's activities. Through the Panel's investigation and the Board's remedial measures when non-compliance is found, civil society may seek to protect its welfare through these instruments. Meanwhile, by airing grievances and making arguments through the Panel, civil society may influence the interpretation of Bank policies and the Bank's future operations on project finance. 
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As far as Bank policies are concerned, there may be cross-fertilisation between these social and environmental standards and international law. 70 First, while these rules are not legally binding under international law, it has been argued that through their incorporation into the loan agreement and their constant practice by borrowing countries in their domestic legislation as well as by MDBs in their lending decisions, the substantive contents of these rules may acquire customary status under international law. 71 Second, the Panel may refer to principles and rules of international law when interpreting these social and environmental rules.
72
More importantly, by promoting the integration of international practice into Bank policies, via private complaints submitted to the Inspection Panel, civil society may contribute to the development of the substantive contents of these rules and their implementation in project finance activities.
The Practice of the World Bank Inspection Panel
The The borrower has an obligation to conduct an EIA, 81 though the Bank advises on its EIA requirements and reviews the findings and recommendations of the EIA to determine if it provides an adequate basis for processing the project for Bank financing. When the borrower has completed or partially completed EIA work prior to the Bank's involvement in a project, the Bank also reviews the EIA to ensure that it is consistent with this policy. It may require additional EIA work to be done by the borrower.
82
When undertaking an EIA in a proposed project, the first step is environmental screening, ie to decide the appropriate extent and type of analysis to adopt. According to OP 4.01 as revised in 2013, a project should be classified as Category A when it is likely to have 'significant adverse environmental impacts that are sensitive, diverse, or unprecedented' . 83 The impact is considered sensitive when it involves issues covered by other Bank policies, such as natural habitats, indigenous peoples, physical cultural resources or involuntary resettlement. An EIA for a Category A project should examine the project's potential environmental impacts and compare them with those of feasible alternatives. It should also recommend any measures to prevent, minimise, mitigate or compensate for such impacts and improve environmental performance. 84 Moreover, the borrower should retain independent experts not affiliated with the project to undertake the EIA. 85 An advisory panel, which comprises independent and internationally recognised environmental specialists, should be appointed to advise on all aspects of the project relevant to the EIA if the project is 'highly risky or contentious or (…) involves serious and multidimensional environmental concerns' . An EIA report for a Category A project has to include an executive summary; a policy, legal and administrative framework; a project description; the baseline data; environmental impacts; an analysis of alternatives; and an environmental management plan. 87 There are other issues that also have to be addressed, including a potential regional/sectoral EIA 88 and the institutional capacity of the borrower.
89
Among other things, an EIA has to examine a project's environmental impacts. The aspects of environmental impacts that should be evaluated for a Category A project include: (i) the project's likely positive and negative impacts; (ii) mitigation measures and any residual impacts that cannot be mitigated; (iii) opportunities for environmental enhancement; and (iv) the extent and quality of available data, key data gaps, and uncertainties associated with those predictions. The dispute involved two inter-related activities. EESRSP included five components to assist the borrowing government's economic reforms. The complaint mainly focused on its institutional element, which included the preparation of a forest zoning plan and the implementation of the new forest concession system. 
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Moreover, TESRO was a budget support operation that supported, inter alia, an improvement of governance in the natural resources sector. The forest-related prior actions that had to be met before the Board approved its operation were a legal review of forest concessions and an extension of the moratorium on new logging concessions.
92
The complaint was brought by indigenous Pygmy organisations and Pygmy support organisations in the DR Congo on their own behalf and on behalf of affected communities. The complainants argued that the forest sector reform activities that the project supported had harmed, and would continue to harm, the forests where these indigenous peoples lived and on which they relied for their livelihood. They contended that the significant adverse social and environmental impacts that may result from the reform programme were one reason why the project should have been assigned a Category A status and an extensive EIA should have been conducted. 93 In this case, the Panel not only held that the project had failed to undertake an EIA on the pilot forest zoning 94 As for the WHC, the Panel found that one of the borrower's natural sites (Salonga National Park), which was included in the List of World Heritage in Danger, appeared to be adjacent to two areas held by concessions. 99 As for the CITES, the Panel noted that there were high-value species of timber in the borrower's territory. In particular, one of the species, ie the African Teak (Pericopsis elata), was listed Regarding the CITES, the purpose of the Convention is to protect wildlife listed in its three Appendices through international trade controls. 106 Among other things, Appendix II species are not necessarily threatened with extinction, but they may become so unless trade is controlled. 107 The export of Appendix II species is prohibited unless an export permit is granted under the authorisation of the state of export. 108 The species concerned in this case, ie the African Teak, had been subject to export control at that time. 109 Considering the high economic value of the African Teak as timber assets, the Inspection Panel also held that the impacts of concessions should have been evaluated. The Inspection Panel's explicit references to the WHC and CITES without the complainants raising them shows how it played an even more active role than the complainants in asserting the borrower's MEA obligations when undertaking the EIA. What is more important is that the Panel has indirectly imposed additional treaty requirements on the Bank, which was not a signatory to either of these MEAs and was not bound by them in a strict sense, in being required to consider the borrower's environmental treaty commitments when deciding to finance projects.
Albania: Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project
The involvement of project-affected populations and local NGOs in the EIA process is important for the public to better understand the implications of proposed project finance activities. Public consultation with those affected can help to identify, not only potential impacts of projects, but also solutions for such impacts. Disclosure of information by the borrower is the prerequisite for public consultation in the EIA. Without knowing about projects and acquiring adequate information about them, affected people cannot meaningfully participate in the EIA process. Therefore, the Bank policy on EIA calls for the borrower to provide relevant project documentation in a timely manner prior to consultation. The information should be in a form and language that is understandable and accessible for those consulted. 111 For Category A projects, in particular, a summary of the project's objectives, descriptions and its potential impacts should be provided for the initial consultation. A summary of the EIA's conclusions should also be provided once the draft EIA has been prepared. Finally, the borrower should make the draft EIA report available in an accessible place for project-affected people.
112
In addition to information disclosure, the borrower has to consult projectaffected people and local NGOs about the environmental aspects of the project and incorporate their opinions. Public consultation should be held as early as The delay in holding public consultations during project preparation and implementation has become a contentious issue in several cases.
115 Albania: Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project is the one that deserves discussion because, in finding the borrower's non-compliance, the Inspection Panel considered the former's treaty obligations which had also been referred to in the complaint. The project involved the construction of a thermal power station (Vlora Thermal Plant) in the Vlora area. The Civic Alliance for the Protection of the Bay of Vlora submitted the complaint on behalf of local residents.
116
The complainants maintained, amongst others, that there were no adequate public consultations during project preparation. They argued that most public meetings were not properly announced, and that the information provided before the meetings was incomplete. Moreover, the meetings were held only after the location of the power plant had been decided. 117 The complainants further stated that a communication regarding the borrowing government's non-compliance with its obligations on public participation and access to information had been 
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brought to the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee, and the latter had found breaches of the relevant obligations.
118
In reaching its conclusions, the Inspection Panel extensively considered the findings of the Aarhus Compliance Committee. It firstly held that, despite the Aarhus Committee focusing on the actions of the Albanian Government rather than those of the Bank, the Committee's conclusions were relevant to the Inspection Panel. This was because Bank policy imposed an obligation on the borrower to hold public consultations and required the Bank to ensure the borrower's implementation of this obligation. Also, the requirements of the Aarhus Convention were similar to those under Bank policy. 119 The Panel then summarised the Aarhus Committee's investigation and findings. 120 It then stated that Bank policy required a project's EIA to consider the borrower's international environmental obligations relevant to project activities. It added that the Bank did not finance project activities that would contravene the borrower's international obligations. As Bank Management did not ensure the borrower's fulfilment of its Aarhus obligations, the Panel concluded that the project did not adhere to Bank policy.
121
In addition to its findings on the borrower's violation of its Aarhus obligations, the Inspection Panel found other breaches in this case. It noted that Bank policy required consultation to take place when preparing the EIA. However, the public meetings concerned were held only after the project site had been decided. 122 The
Panel noted that such consultation only provided post hoc justification for the site selection, which in essence was not a genuine consultation. 123 As for inadequate notification and public participation, the Panel held that, since there was a similarity between the requirements under Bank policy and the Aarhus Convention, and the Panel had also verified the facts that the Aarhus Committee examined, it reached the same conclusion as the Aarhus Committee: the project did not ensure adequate notification and public participation in consultation meetings during project preparation. When an EIA finds that the project would significantly convert or degrade natural habitats, mitigation measures, which may involve minimising habitat loss as well as founding and maintaining an ecologically similar protected area, should be included. 130 The Pakistan: National Drainage Program (NDP) Project case involved resolving the waterlogging and salinity problems in the Indus Basin's existing irrigation network. The project included extending the Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) system, the central feature of which was a spinal drain. This spinal drain disposed of saline effluent, generated upstream of the Indus Basin, through the Tidal Link to the Arabian Sea. 131 However, the project underestimated the risk of extreme meteorological events and it lacked appropriate technical measures during the design of the LBOD system and the Tidal Link. 132 Over time, parts of the structures collapsed. Others suffered damages after being hit by tropical cyclones, 133 causing suffering to people and significant changes to the regional ecosystem.
134
The complaint was filed by several individuals on their own behalf and on behalf of those who lived in the project-affected area. The complainants contended, inter alia, that the affected wetlands and interconnected lakes (known as 'dhands') were an important component of international migration routes for many bird species. 135 In particular, two of the dhands were in the Ramsar Convention List of Wetlands of International Importance, to which the borrowing government was a party. They argued that, according to the Ramsar Convention, the government had to ensure the wise use and conservation of wetlands. Meanwhile, the Bank should not support project activities that would contravene a country's international environmental obligations.
136
The Inspection Panel found that the chosen route of the major drainage canal-the Tidal Link-ran through the biodiversity-rich and productive dhands. However, because of the structures' failure, the dhands had become part of the Arabian Sea's tidal system. High salinity in the dhands had significantly affected the environment. 137 The Panel held that the project had focused on evacuating effluents and had somewhat neglected the impacts on, or means to rehabilitate, the dhands as a habitat and ecosystem. It concluded that this did not comply with Bank policy.
138
The Inspection Panel then mentioned the objectives of the Ramsar Convention. It reiterated the States Parties' obligation to designate suitable wetlands within its territory for inclusion in the Ramsar List and to promote the conservation of wetlands in the List. 139 It stated that the evidence had shown that the dhands under the Ramsar List had suffered negative impacts as a result of rising salinity and changed water flow, which constituted a 'significant conversion or degradation' in terms of Bank policy.
140
The Inspection Panel held that the Bank had failed to consider the risks of further degrading critical natural habitats adequately, saying that 'these Ramsarlisted sites are the type of critical natural habitat that Bank policy promises not to significantly convert or degrade' . 141 It also ruled that actions were not taken to conserve and rehabilitate these degraded natural habitats. The Panel thus concluded that the project did not adhere to Bank policy.
142
In this case, the complainants stressed the importance of the wetlands on which the project had had a negative effect by identifying their ecological value and status under the Ramsar Convention, to which the borrower was a State Party. However, the complainants did not explicitly argue that these wetlands constituted 'critical natural habitats' because of their Ramsar status. 143 This aligns with the Bank policy on natural habitats, which also does not define critical natural habitats as areas listed under the Ramsar Convention or other MEAs. 
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In contrast to the complainants' submissions, in assigning the wetlands concerned as critical natural habitats under Bank policy, the Inspection Panel appears to have considered the criteria for the inclusion of wetlands in the Ramsar List.
145 Its holdings were thus beyond what the complainants argued. Therefore, the borrower's commitments under the Ramsar Convention may increase the possibility for a specific area within its territory to be classified as a 'critical natural habitat' under the Bank policy on natural habitats, thereby reinforcing the Bank's duty to refrain from financing project activities that would cause significant conversion or degradation. In addition, according to the Ramsar Convention, the States Parties have the obligation to promote the conservation and wise use of wetlands, whether they are listed sites or not. 
Forests
According to the Bank policy on forests, as revised in 2013, the Bank intends to: (i) 'assist borrowers to harness the potential of forests to reduce poverty in a sustainable manner'; (ii) 'integrate forests effectively into sustainable economic development'; and (iii) 'protect the vital local and global environmental services and values of forests' . The Bank policy formulations on forests are similar to those for natural habitats in many respects. First, the Bank does not finance projects that would involve significant conversion or degradation of critical forest areas or related critical natural habitats. 151 Here, 'critical forest areas' refer to forest areas that qualify as 'critical natural habitats' under the Bank policy on natural habitats.
152
Second, the Bank does not support projects if they would significantly convert or degrade natural forests or related natural habitats, unless there are no feasible alternatives for the project and its siting, and comparative analysis shows that the project's overall benefits substantially outweigh its environmental costs. 153 Third, the Bank does not support projects that would contravene applicable international environmental agreements.
154
The Cambodia: Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project case best illustrates how the Inspection Panel has dealt with forest issues in a Bankfinanced project in light of international obligations of the borrower. The project involved reforming the regulatory framework for forest concession operations in Cambodia. Its objectives were to improve forest management through effective operational guidelines and to control procedures in forest concessions areas, and to establish forest crime monitoring and prevention capacities.
155
The complaint was brought by a local-based NGO, ie NGO Forum on Cambodia, on behalf of the affected communities living in the concession areas. The complainants stated that the project's flawed design and implementation promoted the interests of logging companies with track records of human rights abuses and illegal logging. They also asserted that social and environmental impacts were inadequately considered, which had harmed forest-dependent communities and would continue to do so. 156 Specifically, regarding the alleged breach of the Bank policy on forests, the complainants contended that the project failed to 'ensure conservation, sustainable use of forests and active participation of local people' . 157 
Conclusion
The creation of the Inspection Panel, as an accountability mechanism within the World Bank, is a crucial development in the international legal system. It allows private individuals affected by the Bank's financed projects, which have traditionally been deemed to benefit borrowing countries, to challenge the legitimacy of the Bank's lending decisions. This shows that the interests between the government and its citizens in project finance activities may not be identical. 169 It also demonstrates the importance of non-economic values, which the World Bank increasingly emphasises, in the pursuit of economic growth through project finance activities. As an internal accountability mechanism within the World Bank, the Inspection Panel has the mandate to examine whether the Bank's decisions and operations on project finance conform to the Bank's safeguard policies. This is important in securing the rights and interests of those who should be the ultimate beneficiaries of Bank-financed projects. By finding the Bank's non-compliance with its policies and procedures, the Inspection Panel not only enhances the 166 WHC (n 96) art 11(1). in project finance activities. As the Inspection Panel is a rule-based dispute settlement mechanism, in order to prompt the Panel actively to take account of MEA obligations when conducting investigations, it is of paramount importance to ensure that complainants advance their arguments according to pertinent Bank policies, which may well involve MEAs in an effective manner. The organisations' sharing of information and experience and assistance for local communities and NGOs, especially those in developing countries, can help to build and strengthen the capacity of civil society to make complaints. As Ellen Hey has noted, although the Inspection Panel does not base its findings on international law in a strict sense, this does not prevent it from considering the project's compliance with treaty obligations pertinent to project finance activities.
178 The Panel's proactive attitude in tackling environmental issues in light of the borrowing government's MEA obligations promotes and contributes to the fulfilment of these treaty requirements by governments and the World Bank when designing, appraising and implementing project activities. Meanwhile, this also allows civil society to influence both the borrowers and the lending institution in implementing project finance activities through Bank policies, which, from a legal perspective, are soft-law instruments. Finally, it is worth noting that the Inspection Panel adopted its pilot approach in 2014 in order to reach early solutions through dialogue without formal investigations. 179 This early problem-solving approach was launched for the first time in Nigeria: Lagos Metropolitan Development and Governance Project, which concerned the compensation issue arising from the demolition of hundreds of homes as part of a housing development project. 180 Future research should investigate if and how the pilot approach will be applied to environmental issues and the role of MEAs, which would otherwise be considered if private complaints are resolved through formal investigations, in the pilot approach. Meanwhile, the World Bank is now reviewing and updating its current safeguard policies. The second draft of the Environmental and Social Framework 
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example in modern international law in that, as an accountability mechanism, it has taken on a positive role of ensuring the projects' compliance with the environmental treaty obligations of the borrowing countries. Other similar mechanisms set up in regional MDBs 184 should learn from the experience of the Inspection Panel when exercising their investigatory mandates.
